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The rising cost of health care is one of the most important policy issues among deve-
loped countries. During 1970s almost all countries experienced more rapid increase of the 
national health expenditure as compared with the increase of GNP. Furthermore, the rate 
of increase of the public expenditure on health was higher than increase of the national 
health expenditure. 
Since rapid rise of the public expenditure on health was a heavy burden for fiscal 
soundness of each government, many efforts have been done in order to reduce the 
increase of it. 
In the first half of 1970s, however, policies seem to be mainly oriented to 'cap' the 
increase without considering the 'supplier-induced-demand' nature of health care. In 
other words, demand factors such as the extension of the insurance coverage have been 
emphasized. 
Demand factors certainly play important roles for the increase of it. In the United 
States, for instance, the introduction of Medicare was an important factor of the rapid in-
crease of the public health expenditure. Another important factor in the United States 
was the favorable tax policy which made people easy to purchase the private health 
insurance, as was pointed out by Feldstein [198IJ, chap. 7. 
As far as we are confined the scope to the case of the United States, demand factors 
seem to be dominant for the rising health care cost. 
If, however, we enlarge the scope of the analysis to the cross-national perspective, 
situation is quite different. Though most countries except the United States have the 
comprehensive health insurance system or comprehensive health service system, relative 
increase of the public health expenditure is much higher in the United States than in 
* Associate Professor. The first draft of this paper was written when the author was at the Japan 
Institute, Harvard University during 1979-80. This Institute and the National Bureau of Economic 
Research provided the opportunity to study for the author. Financial assistance to study in these 
institutions was given by The International House of Japan. The author wants to express his 
gratitude to these institutions. 
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other countries. 
One might presume that this is because of the rapid progress of the quality of health 
care in the United States. Although I refrain from comparing the quality of health 
care among different countries, one may wonder if health and the quality of health 
care are correlated each other in the cross-national perspective. In fact, several health 
indicators concerning mortality and morbidity suggest the U. S. people are less healthier 
than European and Japanese people. 
Therefore, at least from the viewpoint of cross-national study, the difference of the 
demand factors is not a key to understand the cause of the rising health care cost. Much 
study should be concentrated on understanding the supplying factors as causes of rising 
costs. 
The purpose of this paper is to inquire the difference of physician manpower allocations 
and the difference of the hospital administration in the United States, the United King-
dom, and Japan, and then to relate them to the rising cost of health care. Though this 
paper is not enough to show and to contrast the cause of the rising cost in three countries, 
I believe the study in this paper is a first step to compare the different phases of the rising 
health care cost in three countries. 
Moreover, I believe that this study will provide the information for the possible 
institutional change of the supplying system in three countries. By learning the institutional 
difference of other countries, each country will be able to get the wider view for reducing 
the health cost. 
The course of this paper is as follows. In section II, one hypothesis is proposed in 
order to characterize the difference of the allocation of physicians between primary care 
and specialty care in three countries. The difference of the life-time career structure of 
physicians will be emphasized. 
Since I compare only three countries, the statistical test of the hypothesis is impossible. 
Instead, several descriptive statistics are shown. 
Section III is devoted to describe the difference of hospital administration in three 
countries. The comprehensive explanation of the institutional background will not be 
shown. Rather, following topics are mainly discussed: the incentives for the physician (I) 
to practice cost-effectively, and (2) to enhance his/her ability in his/her life-time career. 
Section IV concludes the paper with a few remarks and research topics which should 
be done as further research. 
As an appendix, several statistical comparisons are attached for the understanding of 
the health care in three countries. 
II 
The Difference of the Career Structure of Physicians in Three Countries 
In this section I want to show the difference of the allocation of physicians between 
primary care and specialty care. Especially this difference during the physicians' life-time 
career is emphasized. 
The reason why the life-time career structure is emphasized, can be derived from 
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Becker [1966]'s human capital theory. For instance, incentives for the physician to 
practice cost-effectively and/or to enhance his/her competency would not only be affected 
by his/her present interests but be affected by future prospects of his/her income, and 
status. And these factors seem to influence the total national health expenditure. 
In order to explain how the rising cost of health care is related to physician man power 
allocation, it would be helpful to survey the recent discussion of physician manpower policy 
in the United States. 
The imbalance of physicians among specialties in the United States has been frequently 
noted. Since highly specialized physicians often entail high technology equipments, and 
since relative scareceness of primary care physicians causes the delay of care for patients, 
mal distribution of specialty has been considered to be one of the most important 
factors of the rising cost of health care. (And specialty mal distribution necessarily causes 
geographycal maldistribution.) 
Therefore the excessive prevalence of this phenomenon urged the Congress to take 
legislative steps to repair it. 
The most recent health-manpower legislation (PL 94-484) has mandated that, by 1979, 
at least 59 percent of medical-school graduates must enter training in the primary care 
specialties of family practice, general internal medicine, and general pediatrics.!) 
As was pointed out by Petersdorf [1978J etc., however, this legislation seems unlikely 
to correct specialty maldistribution. 
The reason of the possible failure of this legislation is this: studies by Wechsler et 01. 
[1978] and Levit et al. [1978] showed that many of residents who have completed the 
primary care residency program, continued to study more specialized subspecialty programs. 
Such an effort as to change educational programs does not seem to be sufficient to 
Fig. 1 Hypothesis about- the Allocation of Physicians between Primary Care and Specialty 
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1) The condensed records of the hearing on this health manpower legislation-Health Professionals 
Educational Act of 1976-i, found in LeRoy & Lee [1977J. 
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increase the primary care practice, though it will probably enhance the quality of primary 
care. 
The institutional factors which influence the future prospects of physicians should be 
taken into account. This task could be done by comparing the difference of the institutional 
framework of the physician manpower allocation in three countries: the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan. 
Another study has to be mentioned for the following discussion. Recent comprehensive 
physicians' time studies which were published by Girard et al. [1979] and by Mendenhall et 
al. [1979] show that most of subspecialists not only practice subspecialty care, but devote 
Fig. 2 Post-Graduate Medical Education and the Career Structure of Physicians; 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. I ) 
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The number in the box denotes the length of years. 
The length of residency program in the U. S. ranges from 3 years to 5 years according to 
dilferent specialties. For more detailed explanation, see Elzinga & Jacoby [1977J. 
The distinction between specialist and general practitioner in the U. S. is explained in the 
text. 
4) The career of specialist below senior registrar is the limited-tenure. 
5) The residency program in Japan is not mandated. However, most of physicians who com~ 
p1eted the internship enter this program. 
6) After completing informal residency program, specialists who are salaried physicians in the 
hospital open their clinics and become general practtioners. The mean length of stay as a 
specialist is 11 years. see also Fig. 3. 
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their practice time to the primary care. 
In fact, in order to know the total volume of the primary care, we should mqUlre the 
allocation of physicians' time between these two cares. 
This, however, seems to be a rather specific problem for United States. In the United 
Kingdom and in Japan, these two cares are more clearly devided by each individual 
physician, though in Japan the extent of division is less clear. (This will be discussed 
later.) 
Now the hypothesis is proposed in Figure!. (This figure is simplified for the sake of 
explanation. For more details, see Figure 2.) In Figure I, total volume of physicians' man/ 
hour in each country is shown at the horizontal axis. At the vertical axis climbs up the 
physicians' life-time career. 
The case for the United Kingdom is simple to understand and is also helpful to know 
the difference in three countries. In the U. K., physicians are personally devided into the 
general practitioner and the hospital specialist at the time when they are house officers 
(equivalent to interns). They seldom change their careers one to the other during their 
life-times. 
In the United States, the allocation between specialty care and primary care in terms 
of the volume of man/hour cannot be judged personally. As was referred above, most of 
specialists devote their practice time to the primary care. In other words, each physician, 
to some extent, can intentionally allocate his/her practice time between two cares. 
As long as we campare the difference between two countries, we can safely say that 
the total amount of physicians' man/hour is much motivated to specialty care in the United 
States. 
Fig. 3 The Typical Life-time Career of the Physician in japanlJ 
Retire. 
i (enlarge, enlarge ?) 2) 
Manage and practice in the hospital. 
i enlarge his clinic. 
Manage and practice in the clinic. 
i open the clinical 
Practice in the large hospital 
i 
Study in the teaching hospital 
as a residen t. 
Practice in the 
clinic as a part· 
time job. 
Note: The clinic is defined as the place of practice which has nl, more than 20 beds. 
1 The situation is gradually changing nowadays because of the physicians' specialization 
and the financial difficulty of the clinic. The median age of opening clinic is becom. 
ing higher. 
2 Physicians who have much monetary incentiveJ become just managers. 
3 The average age of opening clinic is 44 years old as of 1976. The median might be 
about the same. 
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Several explanations need for the case of japan. The typical career of the japanese 
physicians are shown in Figure 3. When they are younger, they are employed in the large 
hospital. Since large hospitals can provide facilities for the specialized care, most of them 
practice spe.cialty care. 
When they grow older, most of them exit the hospital and open the clinic. The 
reason of this can be explained by their own organizational nature of the hospital. Since 
the japanese hospital has the closed staff system as well as the British hospital, there should 
be the hierarchical structure within phisicians. Most of them cannot become the top of 
the hospital and cannot even become the top of each department such as internal medicine 
and surgery. Thus most of them cannot climb the ladder up to the top, and want to open 
the clinic. 
This can be contrasted with the situation in the U. S. hospital. Since most of U. S. 
physicians are not employed in the hospital, (the system of which can be called as the 
open staff system,) there is no hierarchical structure within physicians. Tradition of 
egaritarianism among physicians also might be related to this situation." 
This characteristics of physicians' career in japan is observed by the statistics in 
Table 1. At the age of 35-39, more than 70 percent of physicians practice in the hospital, 
while more than 70 percent of them practice in the clinic at the age of 50-54. 
One might presume that this is just due to the different degrees of physicians' speci-
alization. In fact, in the United States, family physicians or general practice physicians 
Table I Age Distribution of Active Physicians (M. D. 's) According to Major Activity: Japan, 1976 
Patient Care 
Physicians Physicians Physicians 
who manage who manage who are 
Age Total the hospital the clinic employed at 
and practice and practice the hospital 
there. there. and practice 
there. l ) 
Total 134,934 3,299 59,605 39,606 
-29 14,566 9 72 6,580 
30-34 11,788 40 473 5,900 
35-39 12,241 151 2,324 6,113 
40-44 14,720 394 5,998 5,537 
45-49 20,525 739 11,932 4,961 
50-54 22, 137 750 14,173 4,292 
55-59 11,312 410 7,221 1,999 
60-64 10,284 287 6, 732 1,589 
65- 17,300 519 10,663 2,605 
I) excludes physicians who work in the teaching hospital. 

















2,204 I. 309 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Iski, SMkaishi, Yakuzaishi Chosa, (Census of Manpower oj 
Physicians, Dentists, and Pharmacists.) 1976. 
2) Historical tradition of egaritarianism among U. S. physicians is explained in Stevens [1971J. 
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consist of older physicians than any other specialty. (See, for instance, the sample survey 
by GMENAC staff papers [1978].) 
However, the effect of specialization in Japan is slightly different from that in the 
United States. We should not confuse the specialization of physicians' competency with 
the fact that specialized care is practiced.3) 
We can show this difference by illustrating the case of internal medicine. Whatever 
specialized field they have practiced in the hospital, they face any type of patients who 
need the internal medicine care in the clinic. 
Though many physicians stay longer in the hospital nowadays than in the past, and 
though many clinic manager-physicians enlarge their clinics to hospitals, the clinic itself 
still takes charge of primary care." 
Now I want to make several comments on how the difference of the allocative 
mechanism affects the cost of health care. 
i) the incentive for the primary care physician 
Several researches such as Mechanic [1972] and Marsh et al. [1976] show that British 
general practitioner (the primary care physician) makes referrals to the specialist more 
often than the U. S. physician. The difference of this behavior can partly be explained 
by their income-earning method. Since U. S. physician is under the fee-for-service 
system, he may have much incentive to practice intensively." 
Although this explanation is persuasive, we should go into more details. The fee-for-
service system itself does not secure higher income to the physician. Rather, less incentive 
for the general practitioner in the United Kingdom can be explained in a different way. 
Comparison of the life-time income between the general practitioner and the specialist 
are reported in Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists' Remuneration [1974J. Though 
general practitioner's income is higher than the specialist's income when he starts to practice, 
his life-time income is reversed. Their status also seems to be different, while there is no 
reliable study for this." It is easier for medical students to become the general practitioner 
than to become the specialist. The difference of the life-time income and the status seems 
to affect the behavior of the general practitioner. 
Japanese primary care physicians, who are under the fee-for-service system, have 
much incentive to practice intensively. Since they are more or less specialists as well as 
the U. S. physician, they want to entail much equipments such as X-rays." 
ii) the incentive for the specialist. 
In order to know the incentive for the British hospital specialist, we cannot ignore the 
3) Statistics in Table 1 are as of 1976. However, this situation is unchanged at least during recent 
ten years. 
4) In Japan, law prohibits the non-physician to be a head manager both in the hospital and in the 
clinic. 
5) We can find an evidence which physicians tend to practice excessively under the fee-for-service 
system in Schroeder & Showatack [1978]. 
6) Todd report [1968J finds the difference of their status as a result of the way to choose them at 
the registrar level. And historical difference of their status also might be important. On this 
aspect, see Honigsbaum [1979J. 
7) Kikkawa [l980] is helpful to understand the competency of Japanese primary care physician. 
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role of senoir registrars and registrars which correspond to U. S. residents. 
Formally, so-called consultants are only specialists and registrars are only trainees for 
specialists. In reality, however, registrars take full clinical responsibility. And the number 
of registrars amounts to about half of that of consultants. (See Table 2.) 
Age distributiOn of senior registrars and registrars in Table 2 shows how long they 
stay as 'trainees', 
Many reports such as so-called Todd Report [1968J and Royal Commission on the 
National Health Service [1979J mention this situation and point out it as the inefficinet 
allocation of physician manpower. (See also British Medical Association, Executive Com-
mittee Council, Report of Council Working Party [1979J and Elston [1977].) 
One senior registrar, McFarlane [1979J expresses his opinion as follows: 
Another and hoary argument for the perputation of excessive numbers of registrars 
(and even of senior registrars) is that fierce competition is the only means of selecting 
the best and honing them to that perfection needed for consultant status. Like most 
spurious arguments, this has some truth but many superimposed layers of fallacy, 
nonsense, and even mischief. A degree of competition is essential to allow selection, 
for the medical student's aspiration may exceed his potential and explosure to real 
tasks is the definitive test: Excessive competition and competition protracted over many 
training years are likely counterproductive. If numbers are too large selection will no 
longer be on the basis of suitability-only the competent will survive the shortlisting 
stage. Final selection will then be arbitrary or whimsical··· .... 
Though we cannot conclude from this opinion that the British specialist has less in-
centive to practice effectively, this opinion suggests the inefficient misallocation of physician 
manpower. 
If, however, there is the general tendency for the younger physician to prefer to 
practive excessively with excessive equipments or with over utilization of laboratory tests 
etc., McFarlane's expression of dissatisfaction can be interpreted as follows: the virtual 
entry barrier to the consultant prevents excessive rising cost of health care in the United 
Kingdom." 
This conjecture is plausible when we compare the situation with the U. S. physician'S 
way of promotion. In the United States, historical egaritarianism among physicians has 
been prevailing. Physicians, only if they obtain the board of certificate, can earn higher 
fees and their status seems to become higher. Physicians who have the board of certificate 
can more freely access to the hospital with much equipments. 
Another important factor which might be related to the rising cost of health care is 
the difference of the hospital administration-especially the role of the physician in the 
hospital administration-. This will be inquired in the following section. 
8) Registrars' opinion is not at least formally reflected in the hospital management. For instance, 
they cannot participate in the Medical Executive Committee which is expected to play the 
important role for the hospital management after the reorganized NBS. See also Brown [1979]. 
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III 
The Role of Physicians in the Hospital Administration 
One of the common and distinctive organational problems in the hospital is the dilemma 
of two lines of authority: the physician and the administrator. Though the administrator 
takes responsibility for the financial conditons of the hospital, he cannot intervene physician's 
clinical decision making. Thus, in some cases, inefficient management of the hospital occurs. 
Although literatures of sociology and organization theory have been inquiring this 
issue, they have not related it to the hospital cost clearly." Recently Harris [1977J and 
Harris [1979J, by describing the hospital management in more details, pointed out the 
inefficiency of the internal cost control system in the U. S. hospital. He characterized the 
administration departments as 'cost centers' and the patient care departents as 'revenue 
centers' and concluded that the medical staff, which is organizationally and functionally 
separate, was divorced from cost allocation scheme. 
While what Harris pointed out is important, it can only be applied to the U. S. 
hospital which has so-called open-staff system. In the United States, most of physicians 
have not directly taken part in the hospital administration. As of 1976, about 70 percent of 
phycisians are office-based physicians. (See Table 4.) Most of office-based physicians who 
are under the open staff system have less incentive to participate in the hospital manage-
ment, because their fees do not depend on the hospital's financial conditions. 
Contrary to the U. S. case, Japanese hospital physicians are salaried physicians in 
principle. However, the way to determine the earnings of Japanese hospital physicians is 
worthy of special mention. Their earnings are determined both at the individual base and 
at the collective base. In the determination of their earnings, the amount of profits for the 
Table 2 Age Distribution according to Activity and Grade: the U. K. (England only), 1977 
Activity Grade 
1 1 Under 1 1 1 1 1 All ages 30 30-34 35-39 40-49 50-59 60-641 65- I Unknown 
Hospital medical staff 30,520 8,859 6,393 4, 121 5,349 4,059 1,591 138 13 
Consultant 11,372 4 495 1,717 4,060 3,539 1,453 104 -
Senior hospital 
medical officer and 1,055 17 67 393 425 125 27 I -
medical assistant 
Senior registrar 2,495 216 1,372 637 240 28 - 2 -(100 ) (8.7) (55.5) (25.5) (9.6) (1.1) 
Registrar 5, 124 1,656 2,154 896 379 29 6 - 4 (100 ) (32.3) (42.0) (17.5) (7.4) (0.6) 
Other 10,474 6,966 2,305 478 245 338 105 31 7 
Hospital practitioner 1 160 1 1 I 61 20 I 58 1 551 17 I 31 
General practitioner I 22,327 1 1,612 1 2, 875 1 2,671 1 6,101 I 5,970 1 7,929 1 1,411 1 
Source: Department of Health and Social Services, Health and Personal Social Services Statistics for 
England, 1978. 
9) On two lines of authority in the hospital, see, for example, Smith [1955]. 
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hospital is taken into account as well as individual factors such as grade, age, and hours 
of work. When the hospital earns much profit, special allowances and special premiums 
for moonlightings are paid to member physicians. IOJ 
Since the distribution of these special allowances is determined by informal negotiations 
rather than by predetermined rule or by contractual base, most of physicians have much 
incentive to participate in the hospital management. This does not necessarily imply that 
physicians practice cost-effectively. For the revenue for the hospital in Japan does not 
necessarily reflect the quality of care properly. 
The salary of the British hospital physician is controlled by the external review body. 
Though, after the reorganized NHS, the institutional change expects the physicians partici-
pation in the hospital management, financial condition of the hospital is not still related to 
the salary. III 
Until now, we have related physicians' incentive only to their short-sighted earnings. 
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Source: the U. S.:American Medical Association, Profiles on Medical 
Practice, 1978. 
the U. K.,: Review Body on the Doctors' and Dentisits' Remune-
ratian, Fifth Report, 1975. (HMSO) 
japan:]injiin, Shokushu-Betsu Minkan Kyuyo No Jz'Uai. (Surlfey 
on Salaries and Allowance according to Occupation) 
Note: For the U. S. and Japan, the data refer to 1977. For the U. 
K., the data refer to 1975, since the income according to 
age cannot be known for the later year. 
The evidence on this can be seen in Nishimura [1977J. This paper, however, treats the problem 
from the different viewpoint. 
The difference of the physician participation in the hospital management between the United 
States and the United Kingdom is summarized in Schultz et al. [1976] and Fox [1978J. 
46 S. NISHIMURA 
practice. In order to discuss this, Figure 4 gives interesting information. In Figure 4 the 
age-income profiles of physicians in three countries are shown. 
It is clear that only U. S. physicians' income starts to decrease at the earlier age. 
This difference is probably due to the fee-for-service system, under which phisicians'hours 
of work immediately result in the decreasing income for the elder physicians. More pro-
found implication, however, can be read from this profile. 
When we compare the behavior of the U. S. physician with those in other countries, 
it may be the common characteristics for the U. S. physician to be eager for enhancing 
their competency and for getting the board of certificate. This characteristics may be 
interpreted as the behavior of which they want to compensate their lower income after 
the middle age. 
Therefore, in spite of the evidence that physicians' career choice does not depend on 
their life-time income, specialization of physician in the United States seems to be related 
to the fee-for-service in the above way.l2> 
IV 
Concluding Remarks 
So far I have discussed the physician manpower allocation and have related it to the 
health care cost. Though I believe that I could have characterized the difference of the 
physician manpower allocation in three countries, the relation of it to the health care cost 
seems to be less clear. 
The reason why I could not propose any definitive hypothesis about the effect of the 
physician manpower allocation on the health care cost lies in the difficulty in evaluating 
the effectiveness of the health care in three countries. 
Though many studies show the health care in the United States is more capital-equipped 
and more costly than that in the United Kingdom, the difference of the effectiveness of 
health care in general is not easy to compare. Though considerable amounts of studies 
are attempting to show the cost-effectiveness of several specific diagnoses and treatments, 
those provide no decisive evaluation to estimate the cost-effectiveness as a whole. 
Therefore, the study in this paper only suggested the probable inefficiency due to the 
misallocation of physician manpower in three countries. I believe, however, that further 
studies on line of this study will be helpful to understand the different phases of increasing 
health cost in three countries. 
As final ramarks, I want to summarize several future researches which should be 
proceeded. 
Firstly, it is clear that the amount of health care cost heavily depends on the behavior 
of physicians as a whole. Though direct economic incentive for the physician to practice 
plays an important role in the determination of health cost, allocation of physicians among 
different specialties also plays a significant role. 
12) Surveys on the relationship between physicians' career choice and their income III the United 
States are found in Institute of Medicine [1976] and Cotterill [1978]. 
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Obviously, it would be desirable to allocate physician manpower depending on physi-
cians' competency. However, this statement tells us almost nothing, because the term 
'competency' is quite ambiguous. Since competency is embodied with the physician himself, 
there always exists uncertainty with respect to the behavior of the physician and with 
respect to the future competency. 
In terms of the economics of information, this can be interpreted in the following way. 
When there exists uncertainty and there exists imperfect information, Arrow-Debreu type 
state-contingent market fails to allocate resources efficiently. In this case, as Akerlof [1976J 
pointed out, some signals or indices are used to allocate resources. 
In case of physician manpower allocation, signals such as the Board of Certificate 
and indices such as grade, age, etc. represent as measures of competency. In the United 
Kingdom, grades such as 'Consultant' represent the competency and influence the total 
volume of health care. In Japan, age is a key factor to allocate physicians between specialty 
care and primary care. 
In the United States, the Board of Certificate plays an important role for the alloca-
tion of physicians among specialties. Though the Board of Certificate represents the com-
petency to some extent, it has some demerit, too. As Freedman [1962J has once criticized 
and as White [1979J tried to show this in case of clinical laboratory personnel, the 
leicensure system Or the board certifying system has its demerits. 
Therefore, our tasks for further researches should be to know how these indices and 
signals playa limited role in allocating physicians efficiently and to know how the combi-
nation of these can attain efficient manpower allocation. 
Secondly, the difference of the physician manpower allocation is closely connected 
with the difference of the hospital amnagement in three countries. Hospital management 
in each country reflects her own social and cultural background. For instance, we can 
find the similarity of the difference of the division of labor and way of promotion between 
British and Japanese hospitals with British and Japanese factories.'" 
Since comparative studies on the difference and the efficiency of the management 
of the private enterprise are prevalent in recent years, these studies will be helpful to 
understand the difference of the efficiency of health care systems. 
Finally, although considerable volumes of comparative studies on health care systems 
in different countries have been done, these are still at the stage of comparing the 
institutional difference alone or comparing the quantitative data alone. It seems to me 
tha we should try to relate the quantitative data to the institutional difference in future 
studies. 
13) Comparative studies on the British and Japanese factories can be found in Dore [1973J and 
Clark [1979J. 
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An Appendix 
Table A-I National Health Expenditure and Related Statistics: 
the U. S., the U. K., and Japan 
year U. s. U.K. 
1966 5.8% 4.2% 
National health 1971 7.6 4.7 expenditure % of GNP 
1976 8.5 5.8 
Percentage increase of 
national health 
1966-1971 35% 25% 
expenditure 







Source: the U. S.: Health Care Financing Administration Health Care Financing 
Review, Summer, 1980. 
the U. K.: Department of Health and Social Security, Health and Pe-
rsonal Services Statist£cs for England, 1978. 
Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare, Kokumill Iryohi Suikei (Esti-
mates on National Health Expenditure), 1978. 
Table A-2 Selected Hospital Statistics 
U. S. U. K. Japan 
(1977) (1976) (1976) 
No. of hospitals 7,099 2,657 8,379 
No. of total beds (thousand) 1,407 489 1,185 
No. of total beds per population 
(per 1,000) 6. 7 8.6 10.4 
Average No. of beds per hospital 198 184 141 
Bed size distribution (%) 




100-199 22.4 41.6 19.8 
200-249 ) 11. 9 
250-299 11.4 11.4 
300-499 10.8 ) 8.5 500- 8.4 10.0 4.0 
Outpatient visit 263, 775 58,218 392,717 
Outpatient visit per hospItal 37,157 21,911 46,869 
Average length of stay 7.6 21. 7 35.3 
(community hospital) (general hospital) 
Source: the U. S. : 
the U. K.: 
American Hospital Association, Hospita Statistics 1977. Chicago. 
Japan 
Office of Health Economics, Compendium of Health Statistics, 1977, London. 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, fryo Shisetsu Chosa, and Byoin Hokoku, (Census 
on the Facilities of Hospital and Clinic, and Hospitals Report) 1976. 
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Table A-3 Cost Component of Health Care: the U. S., the U. K. and japan, 1975 
(Rough estimates) 
U. S. U.K. japan 
(%) (%) (%) 
5.5 12.4 
Net income of ! (general practitioners) (clinic physiciar) physicians 22.3 8.2 8.9 I (specialists) (hospital physiciar) 
personnel 34.9 49. 1 22.4 
Hospital cost (except physicians) 
nonpersonnei 24.9 24.7. 24.5 
personnel l l 8.2 Clinic cost (except physicians) 16.0 12.5 (OlTice cost) nonpersonnel 23.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: the U. S. gross income for physicians are from DREW, National Health expenditures, 1977., 
Expenses for physicians are from American Medical Association, Profile of Medical Practice, 
1975. the component of hospital costs is from American Hospital Association, Hospital 
Statistics, 1975. 
the U. K. Office of Health Economics, Compendium of Health Statistics, 1977. 
Japan, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Kokumin Iryohi Shukei, (Estimates on National 
Health Expenditures), 1975. 
Table A-4 Doctors' Income in Relation to GDP per Head and Earned Income (percentage) 
Ratio of doctors' income to 




U. s. Physicians (1974) 6. 7 4.5 
Dentists (1972) 4.6 3.3 
U. K. (1973) 4.5 3.3 
japan (1975) 6.2 3.8 
Sources: OECD, Public Expenditure on Health, OECD,july, 1977. For 
Japan, PhysJcians' income was estimated by the author. 
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